

Court.").

The Court finds plaintiffs' arguments in response to the Order to Show Cause unavailing. First, as set forth in the Court's Order to Show Cause, the extent to which the Washington State Supreme Court follows Delaware law on the issue of demand futility is an open question. See Dkt. #92 at 3-7. Second, speculation by the plaintiffs that future actions might moot issues in this case does not affect the threshold, and potentially dispositive, issue of demand futility pending before the Court. See Dkt. #80 (F5's Motion To Dismiss Amended Complaint For Failure To Make Demand). Finally, while the certification process will cause some delay in this case, the procedure serves the two broader judicial interests of efficiency and comity: as noted by the United States Supreme Court, in the long run certification saves "time, energy and resources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism." Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974). And, for the reasons set forth in the Court's Order to Show Cause, the Court is of the opinion that certification is necessary under RCW 2.60.020 to ascertain, as a matter of first impression, Washington's substantive standard for establishing when demand is excused pursuant to RCW 23B.07.400(2) in a shareholder derivative action against a Washington corporation.

Therefore, the Court respectfully certifies the following question to the Washington State Supreme Court:

"What test does Washington apply to determine whether allegations made pursuant to RCW 23B.07.400(2) by a shareholder seeking to initiate derivative litigation on behalf of a Washington corporation excuse that shareholder from first making demand on the board of directors to bring that litigation on behalf of the corporation?; and

If Washington follows Delaware's demand futility standard, does it also follow the reasoning of Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341 (Del. Ch. 2007) in cases where the improper backdating of stock options has been alleged?"

The Court does not intend its framing of the question to restrict the Washington State

Supreme Court's consideration of any issues that it determines are relevant. If the Washington

State Supreme Court decides to consider the certified question, it may in its discretion reformulate the question. See, e.g., Keystone Land & Dev. Co. v. Xerox Corp., 353 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 2003).

The Clerk of Court is directed to submit to the Washington State Supreme Court certified copies of this Order, a copy of the docket in the above-captioned matter, and Dkt. ## 1, 37, 39, 49, 50, 53, 54, 59, 60, 67, 69, 74, 80, 81, 84, 86, 87, 89, 90, 92, 94-97. The record so compiled contains all matters in the pending cause deemed material for consideration of the local law in question certified for answer. See RCW 2.60.010, 2.60.030.

The matter is hereby STAYED pending the Washington State Supreme Court's decision whether it will accept review, and if so, receipt of the certified answer to the certified question.

If the Washington State Supreme Court accepts review of the certified question, the Court designates F5 as the party to file the first brief under RAP 16.16(e)(1). The Clerk of Court shall notify the parties as soon as possible, but no more than three days, after the above-described record is filed with the Washington State Supreme Court. The parties are referred to RAP 16.16 and RCW 2.60.030 for additional information regarding the procedure before the Washington State Supreme Court.

DATED this 3rd day of July, 2008.

Robert S. Lasnik

MWS Casnik

United States District Judge